Financial Crisis and Public Policy by Jagadeesh Gokhale
PA Masthead.indd   1 2/9/06   2:08:34 PM
This Policy Analysis explains the antecedents
of the current global financial crisis and critical-
ly examines the reasoning behind the U.S.
Treasury and Federal Reserve’s actions to prop
up the financial sector. It argues that recovery
from the financial crisis is likely to be slow with
or without the government’s bailout actions.
An oil price spike and a wealth shock in hous-
ing initiated the financial crisis. Declines in
stock values are intensifying that shock, threat-
ening to deepen the current recession as U.S.
consumers and investors cut their expenditures.
An offsetting wealth injection from additional
risk-bearing investors could initiate a quicker
recovery. Thus, supporters of government inter-
vention justify the bailout’s debt-financed fund
injections—in essence, they want to compel
future taxpayers to join the group of today’s risk-
bearing investors.
However, the bailout is poorly designed and
its implementation appears panicky—marked by
a knee-jerk trial-and-error process that may have
heightened market uncertainty. Worse, current
interventions in market processes and institu-
tions could become permanent, to the probable
detriment of the nation’s long-term economic
prospects. With or without the bailout, the
ongoing recession is likely to be deep and long.
From a philosophical perspective, any bailout
action provides a host of bad incentives.
Moreover, we should bemindful that future gen-
erations already face massive debt burdens from
entitlement programs. Increasing those burdens
by expanding the bailout program or enacting a
massive fiscal stimulus will hasten the long-
anticipated crisis in entitlement programs. Thus,
the ongoing economic crisis could usher in per-
manently higher taxes, greater government
involvement in the private sector, and a pro-
longed period of slower economic growth.
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Introduction
In October 2008, Congress approved a pro-
posal by Bush administration Treasury secre-
tary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve chair-
manBenBernanke to spendup to $700 billion
of government funds to shore up the U.S.
financial system. The plan initially envisioned
using those funds to buy financial assets—
mostly mortgage-backed securities held by
banks and other financial institutions—that
have lost value in thewake of the housing bub-
ble. Uncertainties about how far home prices
will continue to decline and about the likeli-
hood of future mortgage defaults have made
those securities “toxic.” Financial market par-
ticipants’ unwillingness to lend toor tradewith
institutions holding large amounts of such
securities—especially those backedby subprime
mortgages with declining ratings—has disrupt-
ed credit flows among bank and nonbank
financial institutions.Theconvolutedstructure
of financial contracts for securitizing and
insuringmortgage poolsmakes their valuation
difficult and has contributed to the decline in
market transactions in these securities.
Paulson and Bernanke initially believed
that government purchase of the securities at
prices determined through auctions would
refuel finance by replacing toxic assets with
government cash. However, in the weeks fol-
lowing the congressional vote, the bailout
evolved into a plan to spend at least $250 bil-
lion of the allocated money on purchasing
preferred stock in banks and other financial
companies. That would not eliminate the tox-
ic assets from those firms’ books, but it would
infuse the firms with additional capital in the
hope of reigniting credit transactions and
restoring the financial sector to normalcy.
Regardless of the details, government
efforts to bail out the financial sector have
met with sharp criticism. There is a strong
sentiment among the public that their tax
dollars should not be used to shore up the
health of financial firms that made poor eco-
nomic decisions. It is difficult to disagreewith
that sentiment.
This Policy Analysis, however, examines the
bailout from an economic perspective. Skep-
tics of the bailout believe that struggling finan-
cial firms shouldbe left to fall intobankruptcy.
They believe that the sooner those firms col-
lapse and their assets are purchased by healthi-
er competitors, the sooner the financial sector
can restructure itself to restore normal credit
flows that are vital tomaintaining the broader
economy’shealthover the longterm.Fromthis
perspective, the congressional bailout planwill
only delay proper asset revaluation and
resumptionofnormal credit flows.Thus, itwill
prolong the recession triggered by the bursting
of thehousingbubble as government interven-
tion slows needed structural adjustments in
the financial sector.1 Unless market forces are
allowed to eliminate insolvent financial com-
panies through bankruptcy, restructuring, and
resale, there can be no lasting economic recov-
ery, say bailout skeptics.
Most participants in the bailout policy
debate envision an eventual return to normal-
cy—with bank balance sheets restored and
credit flows operating at customary levels. The
question is about which policies are appropri-
ate to the goal of making the intervening
recession shorter and shallower.
Recessions: Oil Shocks
versus Financial Shocks
Postwar U.S. recessions have usually been
the result of oil shocks combined with restric-
tive monetary policies adopted by the Federal
Reserve to prevent higher energy prices from
inducing a broader inflationary spiral. Oil
price spikes require firms and households to
implement structural adjustments: alter pro-
duction technologies to economize on energy
use or shift to cheaper energy sources. Firms
that cannot adapt technologies to conserve
energy inputs must scale back operations or
fold. Eventually, new firms emerge in less ener-
gy-intensive sectors, especially services. Most
economists agree that in such an environ-
ment, allowing market price signals to facili-
tate needed structural change, rather than
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government-determined resource allocation,
is the best approach.
Although the price of oil has receded in
recent months, the trend in oil prices has
been positive so far during this decade
(Figure 1). Oil prices have been creeping
upward since December 2002 but did not
interrupt the post-2003 surge in housing
prices (Figure 2). The oil price increase was
continual, however, through 2006—rising
from $30 per barrel during late 2003 to
almost $70 per barrel by mid-2006. That sus-
tained increase in oil prices is associated with
a declining trend in U.S. non-oil consumer
spending growth and probably caused hous-
ing price increases to slow during 2006.2
After all, most new home construction in
major metropolitan areas was occurring in
far-flung suburbs, and energy cost increases
meant households could no longer commit
to lifestyles requiring high energy and com-
muting costs. The slowdown in home price
appreciation was tipped into a downturn by
the subsequent, increase in oil prices that
lasted from early 2007 through mid-2008.
Now, although oil prices have pulled back
substantially from peak levels, themain force
propelling economic decline is the continued
devaluation of the nation’s housing stock.
That decline is sustained by the now-large
inventory of unsold homes and gathering
momentum in mortgage defaults and home
foreclosures.3 Figure 2 shows the Case-Shiller
index of home values—a composite index
based on home price samples in 20 U.S.
major metropolitan areas. It shows that
home price changes had moderated for a few
months during the spring of 2002.4 Had that
moderation been maintained, home prices
might have remained close to their long-term
trend through 2003, as shown in Figure 2.
One reason for the rapid escalation inhome
prices through 2006, which was far faster than
the long-term trend and happened despite ris-
ing oil prices, was the populist political agenda
of promoting home ownership. The genesis of
a reinvigorated push for increased homeown-
ership can be dated to President Bill Clinton’s
support, through the Department of Housing
and UrbanDevelopment, for expanded home-
ownership by first-time, low-income, and
minority homebuyers. Policymakers weakened
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regulations governing mortgage loan eligibili-
ty—including incomeandasset adequacy, cred-
it history, and personal interview require-
ments—toexpandhomeownership.5 TheBush
administration, explicitly committed to pro-
motingan“ownership society,” failed to reverse
those policies. The result was a boom in the
homeownership rate from 64 percent during
the early 1990s to almost 68 percent by 2000.
The White House and Congress encouraged
the giant, government-sponsored mortgage
firms Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to expand
into riskier subprime and “Alt-A” mortgage
marketsbypurchasingmortgage-backedpaper
containing contracts originatedunder thenow
fragile borrower-review process.6 With increas-
ing frequency during the early 2000s, lenders
grantedmortgage loans with little or nomon-
ey down, zero closing costs, and/or sparse doc-
umentation of borrowers’ ability to pay.7
Fueledby the expandedavailabilityofmort-
gages, home prices began to accelerate sharply
in 2003, generating the bubble evident in
Figure 2. The figure also shows the trend in
home prices through December 2002, just
before sustained home-price acceleration com-
menced. It shows that although the decline in
housing prices since the spring of 2006 has
been substantial, prices remainwell above their
pre-2003 trend level. As Figure 2 suggests,
homeprices can remainoff their trend level for
considerable periods of time. Thus, based on
their past behavior, home price declines may
continue even after home prices have returned
to their long-term trend path, as shown in
Figure 2.
Now, rates of mortgage delinquency,
defaults, and foreclosures are increasing for all
types of home-loan contracts (Figure 3).8
Unlike the earlier oil price shocks, the housing
wealth shock has resulted in a near collapse of
the financial sector. Investment banking,
whichquintessentially defined the “Wall Street
financial firm,” has been disbanded. The assets
of erstwhile investment banks have been trans-
ferredwholesale throughFed-guaranteeddeals
to other banks or reconstituted as commercial
bankswith access to the Fed’s emergency lend-
ing facilities. Only one investment bank—
Lehman Brothers—was allowed to fail, and it
was dismembered and sold to other financial
firms. Moreover, threats of bank runs because
4
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of deteriorated asset positions have forced the
failure of a few large commercial banks since
mid-2007.
Too Big to Fail?
Many other banks and nonbank financial
companies haveweakening asset positions and
are running short on reserves. The net result is
that credit flow volumes within the financial
sector have been decimated and credit flows
toward nonfinancial sectors—mainline busi-
nesses in transportation, communications,
retail trade, and so on—are declining sharply.
Apart from directly weakening bank bal-
ance sheets, the housing wealth shock has
reduced consumer spending. Both factors—a
constriction of credit flows and slower con-
sumer demand—are causing production slow-
downs. In turn, layoffs are likely to trigger addi-
tionalmortgagedefaults, reducedhomeprices,
and further weakening of bank balance sheets,
making it difficult for credit flows to resume.
The U.S. economy now appears ensnared in a
vicious downward economic spiral.
Thus, an important difference between the
current episode and previous postwar reces-
sions is that this timearound, the financial sec-
tor has beenmassively disrupted. During earli-
er recessions, a well-functioning financial
sector played a key role in facilitating the eco-
nomic recovery: it channeled funds to more
profitable enterprises and curtailed credit to
economically inefficient ones. What are the
implications of a disrupted financial sector for
theensuingrecession?Should the logicapplied
in earlier crises tononfinancial firms—ofallow-
ing insolvent ones to become bankrupt—be
applied to financial firms in the current
episode?
Until the adoption of the bailout plan,
efforts by the Treasury and the Fed to buttress
the financial systemhave beenpiecemeal, with
government rescues being offered only to
firms considered “too big to fail”—that is,
firms whose failure would have dire implica-
tions for the financial system as a whole. This
“systemic risk” threatens the extension of
credit to nonfinancial firms and could deepen
5
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the current recession. Minimizing systemic
risk is a key goal of all federal financial regula-
tory institutions—the Federal Reserve, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Comptroller of the United States, and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
In the current episode, there is plenty of
blame to go around. Bank regulators, the
White House, and Congress all bear some
responsibility: the housing wealth shock has
negatively affected almost all financial firms
holding depreciatingmortgage-backed securi-
ties. But those securities were promoted most
intensely by the mortgage giants Fannie Mae
andFreddieMac, bothofwhich enjoyedaccess
to government borrowing and maintained
some of the highest leverage ratios in funding
and securitizing mortgages, including sub-
prime ones. The irony here is that, despite the
governmental mandate to lower households’
costs of homeownership and regardless of the
systemic risk posed, Fannie and Freddie’s
actions were primarily motivated bymaximiz-
ing their shareholders’ profits.9
Declining home values and rising default
rates mean that financial companies that pos-
sess large amounts ofmortgage-backed securi-
ties are losing value. Weak and worsening
assets on their balance sheets make lenders
fearful of renewing loans. Compounding the
uncertainty among creditors are opaque deriv-
ative structures of securities held by financial
companies. Those portfolios are now difficult
to evaluate in terms of their prospective
returns.10 Creditors’ unwillingness to renew
lending is similar to a “bank run” on financial
companies’ liabilities—pushing them first into
illiquidity, and eventually, to insolvency and
bankruptcy.
With a considerably weaker financial sec-
tor, however, the possibility that financial
bankruptcies could exacerbate and lengthen
the vicious downward economic spiral
strengthens the theoretical case for a govern-
ment bailout. However, the case for govern-
ment intervention requires more than simply
positing the possibility of a vicious economic
spiral. It must demonstrate the existence of a
“market failure” in the financial sector and the
likelihood of a successful government bailout.
Financial institutions have failed at regular
intervals since 2007—beginningwith Country-
wide Bank in July 2007 through the Treasury
backstopping of Citigroup inNovember 2008.
In the intervening period, Bear Stearns,
IndyMac, Lehman, AIG, Fannie and Freddie,
Merrill Lynch,WashingtonMutual,Wachovia,
Citigroup, and other financial firms have been
propped up via public fund injections, taken
over by better-capitalized private firms or fed-
eral agencies, or otherwise restructured or split
up and resold. Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan
Chase have been redefined as commercial
banks. Most of the investment banks, along
with Fannie and Freddie, have now been
restructured, taken over by the federal govern-
ment, or redesignated as commercial banks.
However, the failure of Lehman—which the
Fed and Treasury chose not to protect—had
catastrophic consequences. Policymakers
allowed the firm to fail because they believed
that market traders had plenty of time to note
its shaky financial prospects and protect their
assets. Despite such advance knowledge,
Lehman’s counterparty traders did not act—
perhaps they expected a government bailout as
in the case of Bear Stearns. Hence, when
Lehman went under, counterparties’ balance
sheets were disrupted. More importantly,
financial traders panicked. Lehman’s failure
signaled that the government might refuse
assistance to other financial companies that
encountered liquidity shortages or became
insolvent. The latter fear triggered a global
credit freeze—precisely the outcome that feder-
al regulators are supposed to prevent.11
Concerned Fed officials now believe that
Lehman’s trades and obligations should have
been sustained, even at taxpayer costs, as were
those of Bear Stearns.
Why did Lehman’s failure compound the
financial sector’s problems into a panic?
After Lehman’s failure, the fear that debtors
with poor assets may not be around to pay
back borrowed funds—especially as the Fed
and Treasury signaled that bailouts were not
assured—worsened an already alarming
financial situation into a panic. The word
6
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“panic” sounds overdramatic but appears to
be justified: key indicators of credit risk—for
instance, the difference between interest rates
on three-month European interbank loans
and three-month U.S. government debt, bet-
ter known as the “TED spread”—had already
achieved historic highs and were at many
times their normal levels during mid-2007.
During mid-October 2008, however, their
level shot up still further.12 The Treasury
bailout and the Fed’s injections of vast
amounts of liquidity into the financial mar-
kets have reduced credit-risk spreads from
their October 2008 highs, but they remain
many times higher than their normal (pre-
2007) levels. Lending and borrowing activity
remains paralyzed within the financial sector
and is constraining economic activity in non-
financial businesses (Figure 4). As a result,
the current economic recession is much
deeper and has lasted much longer than the
two previous recessions in 1991 and 2001.
Remedies
The case for government intervention is
based on the argument that, unlike earlier
recessions, the current crisis involves a massive
disruption of the financial sector thatmay not
be cured by market forces alone. This and the
following section examine the reasoning in
favor of a government bailout of the financial
sector. However, the balance of this Policy
Analysis argues that such government inter-
vention is unlikely to be implemented effec-
tively and would only compound the United
States’ grim long-term financial outlook.
Indeed, as of this writing, many observers are
bemoaningtheunsatisfactory implementation
of the Treasury bailout.
A negative wealth shock normally induces a
7
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decline in output and consumption. Main-
taining them at the pre-shock levels requires
that someone lend additional funds to com-
pensate for the negative wealth shock. Those
funds could be used to sustain current con-
sumption and purchase new assets—say, more
oil drilling equipment instead of houses—that
can be used to restore the nation’s output and
consumption growth. And the additional debt
and capital infusions would be repaid from
production and profits in the future.
New funding sources require an expansion
of the pool of risk-bearing creditors. But few of
those creditors can be founddomestically; U.S.
households’ budgets are stretched to the limit,
because of their hitherto high-consumption
and low-saving lifestyles. Americans are over-
burdened with debt (Figure 5) and are now
experiencing declining asset values (Figure 6).
One potential source of additional capital is
foreign savers. By extending more credit to us,
theywould bear additional financial risk as the
U.S. economy undergoes its structural reorga-
nization—say, shifting away from housing and
toward energy exploration, from financial
engineers toward regular ones, and so on.
Unfortunately, foreigners are unlikely to
step inwith sufficient capital to resolve the cri-
sis. Foreign savers have already lent substantial
amounts to U.S. firms and households in the
past and the global nature of the current
downturn shows that they are not immune to
a contraction in U.S. consumption. Their
financial institutions are also exposed to the
downturn in U.S. home prices and they, too,
will need to conserve cash. And they are just as
fearful of the toxic and impenetrable mort-
gage-related securities on U.S. financial firms’
balance sheets as any other potential creditors.
If foreign firms are unwilling to lend as
much as is needed because of risk considera-
tions, why don’t interest rates increase to com-
pensate them for larger loan amounts and
higher risks? The answer is that rate increases
only work up to a point. Issues of risk, trust,
and reputation are difficult for creditors to
evaluate and, beyond a point, those attributes
may be negatively associated with larger loan
amounts. Recall that oil magnates and other
foreign fundsextendedsomeadditional capital
to someU.S. financial firms a fewmonths ago,
butonlyunderverygenerous returnsandguar-
antees.13 They probably possess more loanable
funds, but they won’t extend more credit to
8
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U.S. financial firms, even under still-more-
lucrative terms.
Inmostmarkets—take oranges as an exam-
ple—the exchange of goods for money is
simultaneous and the characteristics of both
are easily observable. In credit markets, how-
ever, transactions are nonsimultaneous.
Delivery of funds from creditor to debtor, and
repaymentwith interest, are separated in time.
Lending thus requires prior creditor confi-
dence inborrower creditworthiness. Such con-
fidence arises only when the creditor has good
knowledge about the borrower’s financial
condition—the asset side of the balance sheet.
Today, however, with many financial com-
panies carrying toxic assets on their balance
sheets, potential lenders are unable to verify
borrowers’ creditworthiness. Many potential
lenders are also concerned about needing cash
reserves themselves in the future and are seek-
ing to conserve liquidity. After apoint, ashigh-
er demand for loans and smaller supplies of
cash reserves cause borrowers to increase their
interest rate offers, total loan supply may
decline, rather than increase, in response.
That’s because willingness to pay higher inter-
est rates on a larger loan itself constitutes a
negative signal of creditworthiness.
Both adverse selection and moral hazard
potentially play a role in credit and capital
markets, causing their failure during times of
high market uncertainty. Adverse selection
refers to the phenomenon where the riskiest
borrowers—those with the smallest likeli-
hood of servicing and repaying loans—would
be the ones willing to offer higher interest
rates. Andmoral hazard refers to (changes in)
borrowers’ behavior that makes loan service
and repayment less likely (and defaults more
likely) after obtaining loans under onerous
terms. Being concerned about these phenom-
ena, creditors generally refuse to commit
more than a maximum amount of funds no
matter how high the loan interest rate is.14
Indeed, as interest rates increase, lenders may
reduce the amounts that they are willing to
lend. This aspect of credit transactions is dif-
ferent from the normal market for oranges,
wherein supply increases without limit (in
principle) in response to higher prices.
It should be noted that the problems of
adverse selection and moral hazard caused by
9
Both adverse
selection and
moral hazard
potentially play a
role in credit and
capital markets,
causing their
failure during
times of high
market
uncertainty.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
07
-Q
1
20
07
-Q
2
20
07
-Q
3
20
07
-Q
4
20
08
-Q
1
20
08
-Q
2
Financial assets Tangible assets
Figure 6
Household Assets as a Percent of GDP
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
Pe
rc
en
to
fG
D
P
361497_PA364_1stClass:361497_PA364_1stClass  3/12/2009  9:08 AM  Page 9
asymmetric information in creditmarkets also
have private market solutions. Firms specializ-
ing in producing information on credit and
borrower quality, security ratings and risk pro-
files, and industry performance measures
emerge to perform the necessary evaluation
and monitoring tasks that are too costly for
individuals, and even institutional investors, to
undertake.However, thecurrent financial crisis
is characterizedby the evident failure of ratings
agencies to provide reliable information on the
quality of mortgage-backed securities.
Restoring their reputations and functions will
require evidenceofbetterperformance that can
only be accumulated over the long term.
Under the current financial market envi-
ronment, creditors are especially nervous
about their counterparties’ creditworthiness,
and especially about how much their future
asset positions will deteriorate because of
declining house prices. Indeed, a credit freeze
indicates extreme fear about borrowers’
creditworthiness. Today, the maximum loan
amounts, beyond which market price signals
fail to induce additional credit supply, are very
near zero. That reasoning probably explains
why foreign savers and oil-rich sovereigns
won’t extend additional capital to supportU.S.
financial companies.
The Call for Intervention
As the U.S. financial crisis persists, policy-
makers feel compelled to act. They seek to
counter the housing-wealth shock by extend-
ing the pool of risk-bearing creditors. With oil
magnates andotherwealthy foreigners unlike-
ly to provide sufficient capital injections to
privateU.S. firms, policymakers are turning to
another group of prospective creditors: future
U.S. generations, who can be “forced” to lend
through a debt-financed government bailout
plan. Intervention proponents can argue that
future generations, were they around, should
andwould be willing to sacrifice some of their
(eventually larger) resources to help current
generations (and themselves) to dig out of a
potentially prolonged economic downturn.15
However, future generations cannot directly
extend this credit because they, and their
wealth, do not yet exist. This reflects a form of
market incompleteness that prevents a solu-
tion to the current financial market failure.16
That failure provides theoretical justification
for government to step in andeffectively trans-
fer resources from future generations to those
alive today17—assuming that this transfer will
be effective in preventing or reducing econom-
ic harm from the financial crisis.
Bailout supporters point to two reasons to
believe that the bailout might help to resolve
the financial crisis. First, they claim the current
version of the bailout would broadly recapital-
ize banks and revive borrowing and lending
activity. It is tempting to think that capital
injections should be limited only to financial
firms that made reasonable investments but
suffered illiquidity because of a widening
financial panic, not to those near insolvency
because of high exposure to toxic mortgage-
related securities. In general, this principle
should be followed. However, judging which
banksdeservehelp andwhich shouldbe termi-
nated may be very difficult and time-consum-
ing, given the broad and deep penetration of
housing-related asset failures. Separating the
good from the bad would involve unwrapping
many layers of complex derivative instruments
and the imposition of arbitrary (nonmarket)
asset valuations. It would create wasteful lob-
byingactivityby financial firms, a strong incen-
tive for corruption, and require intense public
(congressional) scrutiny.
Second, direct capital injections by theU.S.
government may induce private wealth hold-
ers and foreign savers to commit additional
funds to U.S. financial institutions. That
inflowof capital could prevent the credit crisis
from developing into an economywide credit
crunch. Such complementarities in alternative
investment sources might occur simply
because the commitment of future taxpayer
funds could reduce foreign investors’ percep-
tionsof credit risks amongU.S. financial firms
and stimulate additional lending.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the
government should tailor public policies to the
10
The current
financial crisis
is characterized
by the evident
failure of ratings
agencies to
provide reliable
information on
the quality of
mortgage-backed
securities.
361497_PA364_1stClass:361497_PA364_1stClass  3/12/2009  9:08 AM  Page 10
causes and symptoms of particular recessions.
Thoughtful proponents of government inter-
vention would argue that recessions arising
fromshocksto inputprices—suchasoilprices—
that are limited to nonfinancial sectors require
restructuring by private firms through techno-
logical change. That’s best achieved through an
unfettered operation of market forces. In con-
trast, they argue, recessions involving a large
wealth shock—in this case, declining home val-
ues—that results in a broad financial sector col-
lapse require a different approach. Given the
crucial role of the financial sector in greasing
the economy’swheels, and given the significant
potential for market failure (a credit freeze
because of asymmetric information and inten-
sified adverse selection and moral hazard), the
recapitalization of financial intermediary firms
requires borrowing from abroad and from
future generations. New government borrow-
ing could induce more investment by foreign-
ers, promoting a quicker restoration of bank
capital and an eventual return to normal levels
of financial intermediation.
In short, bailoutproponentshavemetanec-
essary condition for government intervention:
there is a financial sector failure that could
impede the market’s self-correcting mecha-
nisms, resulting in considerable harm to the
nation’s—and the world’s—economy. More-
over, there are some theoretical grounds to
believe the bailout plan could address the cred-
it crisis and reduce the severity of the looming
recession. However, there are several reasons to
believe that thebailoutwill be ineffective—most
importantly because it is being implemented
badly, despite the best efforts of government
officials. Moreover, the Treasury bailout plan—
and any giant new fiscal stimulus plan cobbled
together by the Obama administration and
Congress—will worsen the nation’s already
bleak long-term fiscal outlook.
The Psychology of Contagion
The financial crisis is causing distress
among many who are not directly involved in
the financial sector and panic among those
who are. Many people are seeing the value of
their retirement savings dissolve as the stock
market drops like a stone. Since its peak in fall
2007, the S&P 500 stock index had lost nearly
45 percent of its value by the end of 2008.
Underlying the losses is a near-total collapse of
financial intermediation—the availability of
credit, especially short-term and unsecured—
on a global scale. Not surprisingly, the main-
line U.S. economy, other than construction
(which was already in decline)—transporta-
tion, communications, agriculture, and so
on—is being forced to operate under tighter
credit constraints and many companies are
beginning to downsize. As a result, the civilian
unemployment rate has spiked by more than
2 percentage points since January 2008.
TheFederal Reserve has providedhundreds
of billions of dollars in liquid cash reserves to
commercial and noncommercial financial
institutions. It is alsooffering topurchasenon-
financial firms’ commercial paper to support
credit transactions in the economy, and now
pledges “unlimited” liquidity provision and
guarantees interbank lending. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation has increased
limits on deposit insurance. And Congress
passed a $700 billion bailout bill to fund pur-
chases of toxic assets by the Treasury in the
hope of easing the credit crisis. The Treasury
has dedicated up to $250 billion of that $700
billion to purchase preferred shares and war-
rants in financial companies. All of these
unprecedented actions have been taken in the
hope of preventing financial sector illiquidity
frombecomingawidespreadcredit crunchand
triggering a global economic recession.
The most poorly understood aspect of the
financial sector crisis is “contagion”—the
spread of balance sheet weakness and defaults
across a swath of financial firms just because a
small segment of the mortgage market (sub-
prime loans) soured and one large financial
firm (Lehman) was allowed to fail. The keys to
understanding contagion are the roles played
in the housing bubble by mortgage under-
writers, securitizers, and insurers; investment
banks; ratings agencies; and foreign and
domestic investors—banks, pension and
mutual funds, and individuals. The complex
and convoluted interrelationships among
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them have brewed a financial “perfect storm.”
What is the nature of these interrelationships,
and why would the collapse of one sector—
housing—trigger a nationwide financial col-
lapse and threaten a global recession?
Financial innovationsduring the last three-
and-a-half decades utilized all of the profes-
sions listed above. State-licensed mortgage
finance companies and commercial banks
originated mortgage contracts for a fee. Loan
originators pooled and securitizedmortgages.
Mortgage service payments accruing to the
pool were divided into different categories—
tranches—with varying default risks. The pay-
ment streams were connected to bond issues
of different ratings for sale to investors.
National ratings agencies gave high grades
to the bonds supported by the safest cash
flows.18 About 80 percent of the securities
issued received the highest rating, on par with
those of Treasury securities, the world’s safest
financial paper. Indeed, mortgage-originating
banks held the safest mortgage-backed securi-
ties in their own portfolios, the remaining
being “adversely selected” for sale to other
investors. Investors seeking higher returns
purchased the securities backed by riskier
tranches. Such securitization of mortgages
was intended to distribute the risk of mort-
gage underperformance or nonperformance
across a broad range of investors—according
to their preferences and tolerance for bearing
financial risks.
Mortgage securitization served to both
pool and spread risks. The pooling aspect
combinedmortgages from different locations
to achieve a low correlation between their
default rates. Risk spreading was achieved by
issuing and selling securities backed by such
mortgage pools to many investors, each of
whom bore a small part of the risk of any giv-
en pool.19
A second element in financial firms’ opera-
tions was the placement of highly leveraged
bets. As is commonly known, financial firms,
including banks, borrow for short durations
and lend over longer ones. The gap inmaturi-
ty lengths on the asset and liability side of the
balance sheet is a means of earning income—
long-term loans, although less liquid, earn
higher returns than the interest rates paid on
short-term deposits. Whereas banks are sub-
ject to limits onhow large their loanportfolios
(i.e., assets) can be relative to bank capital,
investment banks and other nonbank finan-
cial institutions face no such limits.20 They
borrowedup to 30 times asmuch as their own
capital to invest in long-term illiquid assets
such as mortgage-backed securities. But high-
leverage ratios come with the risk of having
too little capital to fall back onwhen creditors
become skittish anddemandevidence that the
firm can meet its obligations. The decline in
stock market values of investment banks trig-
gered just such concerns among creditors.
Failures loomed as assets could not be sold at
“fair” values commensurate with their long-
term return prospects. The resulting illiquidi-
ty was compounded, because, at a time of low
confidence among market participants, most
were also interested in selling assets them-
selves, thus exacerbating market price
declines.21
Asmany investors are now painfully aware,
the risk-pooling and risk-spreading functions
ofmortgage-backed securities involved a third
effect: concealment from investors of the
sources and locations of those risks in the
financial firms’ balance sheets. The fact that
mortgages with high default risks are hidden
deep within complicated derivative instru-
ments would not matter if home prices were
still increasing. On balance, such financial
securities would still garner handsome prof-
its—loan servicers acting onbehalf of creditors
would simply foreclose on the homes and
pocket the capital gain. But in a housing price
downdraft, investing in such securities
requires prior confidence that they are not
backed by highly risky mortgages.
With the broad-based decline in housing
prices, creditors’ confidence in the solvency of
highly leveraged financial firms declined and
caused the creditors to curtail lending to firms
holding mortgage-backed securities in their
portfolios. The continued decline in home
prices has affectedmortgage-backed securities
well beyond the subprimehousing loan sector,
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spreading much more broadly among banks,
pension funds, and other investors.
Why are risks across balance sheets of so
many firms in different areas within the finan-
cial sector so highly correlated? Is there not a
functional division of labor among financial
firms whereby some specialize in funding
mortgage-backed assets, others in commercial
ventures of different kinds, while yet others
provide insurance services, and so on? Why
should so many bank and nonbank financial
firms become embroiled, all together, in a
housing-related financial panic?
Those questions point to the second ele-
ment of financial innovations involving mort-
gage-backed securities. It involves a key finan-
cial discovery: the Black-Scholes formula for
dynamic hedging. This formula shows how
portfoliomanagers couldminimize their expo-
sure to price risks of securities in their portfo-
lios. It calls for selling the correct amount of
options against securities held in their portfo-
lios todiversify away—orhedge—each security’s
price risk.22 For instance, suppose an investor
holds an asset that will likely increase in value,
but there is a small chance the assetmay fall in
value. If the investor is unwilling to expose
himself to the risk of loss, he can sell an option
on the asset such that the asset buyer would
receive part of the gain if the asset experiences
a large increase in value. In return, the original
investor receives an up-front premium from
the option buyer that offsets the original
investor’s risk that the asset will decline in
price. The Black-Scholes formula, if imple-
mented correctly through time, will almost
completely eliminate the original investor’s
price risk. In the words of the original Black-
Scholes study, “the returnon the (dynamically)
hedged position becomes certain.”23
The real world counterparts to dynamic
hedging are instruments called credit default
swaps (CDSs). These are contracts through
which one party pays another a fixed amount
for the right to receive a pre-specified payment
depending on the occurrence of a specific
event—say, the failureof a firmora security, the
change in a security’s price beyond a certain
threshold, and so on. Such transactions are
useful as they collectively reveal information
and beliefs that individualmarket participants
possess about the likelihood of various finan-
cial market outcomes. For instance, if CDSs in
a certain security were suddenly to become
more expensive, itwould indicate that themar-
ket believes the security has become riskier
than previously thought.
So why didn’t CDSs and other derivatives
used to hedge against mortgage defaults indi-
cate the growing risks in the home finance
market? Part of the reason might be that ana-
lysts simplyunderestimated that risk.However,
at least part of the reason is the increasingly
complex and opaque world of finance.
Mortgage-backed bonds, their insurance and
reinsurance—using derivative instruments like
CDSs—and their sequestration in special-pur-
pose “offbalance-sheet agencies” (called “struc-
tured investment vehicles”) created a convolut-
ed network of counterparty assets, insurance
contracts, and liabilities inwhich global invest-
ment banks, hedge funds, and commercial
banks became involved. All of it wasmotivated
by first pooling, and then spreading,mortgage
and other investment risks widely among
investors across the globe.
Given the complexity of financial instru-
ments and associated interrelationships bet-
ween financial firms, it’s not surprising that
most financial firms and ratings agencies were
unable to judge properly the risk/return char-
acteristics of firms’ portfolios—cash reserves,
stocks, bonds, mortgage-backed securities,
CDSs, andotherderivative contracts.Directors
of most large financial, insurance, and even
mainline manufacturing companies are fre-
quently unaware of the nature and extent of
their firms’ involvement in a wide array of
financial transactions, including mortgage-
backed assets, CDSs, and other derivatives.
Thebottom line: noonewas in aposition to
judge the buildup of “systemic risk”—that is, to
take account of risk magnification for the
financial systemasawhole—fromareversion in
home price appreciation. As mentioned earlier,
the location anddistribution of problemmort-
gagesmay not be important for investorswhen
housing and most other sectors of the econo-
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my are booming. Positive performance by
most loans would offset the likely minimal
losses on problem home loans. The risk of
default would remain low as homeowners
continued to benefit from surging home
prices and homes backing distressed mort-
gages could be sold easily and at a profit.With
the bursting of the house price bubble, howev-
er, the exposure ofmortgage-backed securities
to problem loans underwent a quantum
increase, and the location of such loans sud-
denly became very important for investors and
insurers.
Now, underperforming mortgages could
potentially dominate positive performers, and
investors need to know where the former are
located tomaintain confidence in their overall
lending operations. The lack of knowledge of
the overall distribution and locations of risky
assets across financial firms can itself lead to
risk magnification.24 It occurs because all
investors simultaneously (and rationally) re-
evaluate their counterparties’ risk exposure
and creditworthiness and reduce their lending.
Very fewmarket participants, if any, can antici-
pate and assess the consequences of an imme-
diateupwardreevaluationbyallparticipantsof
their own and other participants’ risk expo-
sures on account of a joint negative shock to
their asset values.Thisprocess canbecomeself-
fulfilling: constrained credit flows to financial
and mainline firms worsen economic perfor-
mance and fulfill creditors’ prior expectations
of increased default risks.25
Under theongoinghousingpricedecline, it
may be thatmost investors and financial com-
panies are exposed to only a small amount of
risky (subprime) mortgage-backed securities.
But firms’ portfolio compositions are not
public information. The possibility that one’s
financial counterparty (options trader, bor-
rower, insurer, and so on) may be exposed to
significant housing-sector risks stimulates a
behavioral change in financial firms’ willing-
ness to lend. And when firms are highly lever-
aged, sudden adverse market conditions and
creditor demands that borrowers demonstrate
their ability to service debts can trigger a
scramble for cash that canprovedisastrous for
those with a low capital base.26
In this regard, a key issue is whether policy-
makers themselves understand that once a
systemic shock is in motion—a process of
deleveraging by withdrawing, recalling, or sell-
ing the financial firm’s investments to obtain
cash and consolidate its capital base—
investors and other market participants are
especially sensitive to news about the financial
sector’s and the economy’s prospects. Any
announcements that market and economic
prospects are worsening can become self-ful-
filling. Thus, recent high-visibility press con-
ferences and speeches by policy officials to dis-
cuss how the current financial crisis places the
economy at great risk probably exacerbated
the problem considerably.
Will the Bailout Plan
Restore the Economy’s
Health?
The original Treasury plan to purchase tox-
ic mortgage-related assets from firms’ balance
sheets has morphed into one where the gov-
ernment directly injects capital into financial
firms by purchasing stocks and warrants in
those firms. In addition, the Federal Reserve is
expanding liquidity through “quantitative eas-
ing” measures, guaranteeing interbank loans,
purchasing commercial paper, and guarantee-
ing housing-related obligations of financial
companies. The capital injections and added
liquidity are intended to restore confidence in
financial markets, thaw frozen lending within
the financial firms, and ease credit conditions
fornonfinancial sectors. So far, the resultshave
been disappointing, and it remains unclear
whether they will ever work as desired. If they
remain unsuccessful, future taxpayers will be
exposed to additional debtburdens to the tune
of many hundreds of billions of dollars with-
out inheriting a robust economy.
Economists are split among multiple
groupsonthewisdomofagovernmentbailout
of the financial sector. Opponents of the
bailout cite many reasons against it: it would
unfairly compensate those who made risky
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investments, take too much time to imple-
ment, impose losses on taxpayers, push the
financial sector onto an irreversible path
toward socialism, and so on. Supporters of the
bailout think it can still succeed, with some
modifications. However, it is likely that amod-
ified bailout will do little to alter the ultimate
length or severity of the recession.27
The economy has experienced a negative
wealth shock. The housing assets we invested
in are worth less than we thought, as reflected
by a marked and continuing decline in home
prices. The realization that we are not as
wealthy as we once thought will modify our
economic behavior. We’ll consume less and
save more. That change is likely to prolong
housing price declines as potential homebuy-
ers stay away and homeowners opt to delay or
discontinue servicing their mortgages. But
higher saving rates may not generate higher
total saving if incomes decline simultaneously
because of the credit crunch. As a result, finan-
cial sector balance sheets may continue to
weaken and credit conditions for nonfinancial
sectors may continue to tighten. Eventually,
the credit squeeze is likely to reduce total out-
put, cause job losses, and result in further
declines inhomeprices.Acompounding factor
is the associated decline in companies’ share
prices, again weakening financial sector bal-
ance sheets—and so on.
The remedy for a large wealth shock is a
large wealth injection, financed either by for-
eigners or by future generations in the form of
deficit-financed asset swaps with financial
firms.28 The magnitude of the required asset
swaps would have to be much larger than the
$700 billion ammunition provided to the U.S.
Treasury by Congress. The Fed’s portfolio of
Treasury securities (currently about $1.8 tril-
lion) is also being brought to bear. Consider,
however, that during the stock market implo-
sion in 2000, household losses in stock values
were offset by housing price increases. The cur-
rent episode is characterizedbywealth losses in
both housing and stocks. As of the second
quarter of 2008, home prices (based on the
nationally representative Case-Shiller home
price index,which also controls for homequal-
ity differences) had declined by 17 percent
from mid-2007 when household real estate
wealth peaked at $20 trillion. That implies a
wealth loss of about $3.4 trillion.29 The decline
in stock market wealth over the same period,
including corporate equities, mutual funds,
andpension funds, is estimated at $9.7 trillion,
based on a 40 percent decline in stock values
since mid-2007.30 Even if some stock market
losses are recouped as the market rebounds
from its current lows, the total wealth loss will
likely remain larger than the bailout fund and
expansion of the Federal Reserve’s portfolio.
Moreover, the implementation of equity
injections is taking inordinately long and it’s
not clear that they will effectively thaw frozen
credit flows. Despite the injections currently
under way, credit risk indicators remain elevat-
ed. The latest Treasury initiative of purchasing
preferredbankstocksof financial firms,broad-
ly defined, is being justified on grounds that
they can be implemented speedily and would
be more effective at restarting credit flows in
the economy. However, government purchases
of equities, rather than poorly performing
assets from banks, hold other dangers, as
described in the next section.
Good Intentions on the
Road to Hell
It’s difficult to predict whether the U.S.
Treasury’s initiative to purchase equity stakes
in financial firms will succeed in quickly
quelling the current financial panic. What is
worse, it sows the seeds for a new financial
collapse by repeating and compounding the
moral hazard problem that has already bank-
rupted Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The Treasury has injected $250 billion in
exchange for preferred stocks in financial
firms. Equity injections were forced on nine of
the largest financial firms—even well-capital-
ized ones, bringing into question the need for
such support in the first place.31 The purchase
of preferred equities is a sharp departure from
theTreasury’s initial proposal topurchase tox-
ic assets from financial companies thatwished
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to unload them.What happened? Perhaps the
Treasury didn’t receive sufficient bids from
financial firms to unload bad assets. That
would not be surprising, because accepting
government help would be associated with
executive compensation limits and forced
lending to insolvent homeowners. And it
would signal weak asset positions, causing
potential private creditors to flee.
Quite likely, actions by theUKgovernment
andEuropeanUnion to inject equity capital in
their financial sectors forced the U.S. govern-
ment’s hand. Without similar measures, U.S.
banks would be perceived as being riskier and
would lose business to European banks.
Whatever the short-term reasons for such a
move, partial nationalization of financial
companies is a bad idea in both the short and
long terms.
The difference between debt purchases and
injecting equity capital into financial compa-
nies is profound. Debt purchases would limit
the government’s direct involvement with pri-
vate asset ownership through the point of debt
maturity simply because the debt’s value will
eventually be resolved. Either the government
(taxpayers) will make a profit on the debt
because its value turnsout tobe larger than the
discounted price paid for it, or it will make a
loss if the value of the debt turns out to be
worth less. In either event, the government’s
direct involvement in the private sector is lim-
ited to the term of debtmaturity.
In contrast, equity infusions into private
financial firmswill appearasa capitaloutlayby
taxpayers. The advantage of an equity infusion
is that it can be implemented relatively quickly
and it enables taxpayers to share in the upside
of troubled firms’ operations after credit flows
resume normalcy—more so than through pur-
chases of bad debt from financial firms.32 The
problem is that once the financial crisis has
passed, there’s no guarantee that the govern-
ment will sell its equity stakes in private finan-
cial companies. Continuing government co-
ownership would be justified for recovering
returns on earlier taxpayer investments and as
a way of keeping taxes low. Taxpayers will bear
two additional costs as well: additional debt
service for initially financing the equity pur-
chases, andadditional business risks. The equi-
ty premium over debt-service costs that tax-
payers receive will cause marginally greater
volatility in federal receipts, which in turn will
occasion greater volatility in taxes and larger
fluctuations in Treasury bond prices because
of larger variability in annual federal deficits.
Perhaps the most important argument
against purchasing equity of private compa-
nies is the example of FannieMae and Freddie
Mac. The two government-sponsored enter-
prises expanded rapidly and obtained cheaper
financing because of an implicit government
guarantee. Last summer, the federal govern-
ment was forced to make the implicit guaran-
tee explicit when Fannie and Freddie’s opera-
tions grew too bloated with questionable
mortgage-backed securities, and private
investors refused to refinance their highly
leveraged portfolios. Purchasing equity stakes
in many more private firms will magnify this
moral hazard problem. Having invested in
financial companies, the government would
be forced to prop them up with additional
capital injections rather than allow them to
fail, thereby risking another financial panic.
The $250 billion equity injection is sup-
posed to be temporary. However, if the ratio-
nale for its implementation in the United
States is thatmanyother countrieshave adopt-
ed it, we (and correspondingly, foreign govern-
ments) are effectively locked into this policy.
Unilateral sales of the U.S. government’s equi-
ty positions would create an advantage for for-
eign banks that continue to be backed by their
governments—just as implicit government
guarantees to Fannie and Freddie conferred a
pricing advantage to those agencies among
home-loan investors.
In the future, continued government involve-
ment in financial firms may be justified by
Congress on several grounds: financial compa-
ny failuresmustbeprevented toavoid financial
panics; a Republican administration, no less,
acquiesced in implementing this initiative; for-
eign banks otherwise would be unduly advan-
taged, and so on. Chances are, however, that
despitepromisesof stricter regulationof finan-
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cial companies, politicians’ power and incen-
tives to expand home loans and other credit to
thosewith poor credit recordswill be strength-
ened—setting the stage for a future financial
panic—because, rather than in spite of, the
Treasury’s initiative.
Further, capital injections in financial firms
raise the prospect of similar injections in non-
financial firms in the future, if andwhen those
sectors face difficulties. This Policy Analysis
has acknowledged that because of informa-
tional asymmetries inherent in credit transac-
tionsandthepotential for contagion, thought-
ful bailout proponents could theoretically
justify government intervention to restore
proper functioning of the financial sector and
avoid systemic risks to the economy. But this
argument isnotwidely appreciatedby thepub-
lic and it canbemisappropriatedby supporters
of broad government intervention in the econ-
omy.Unprecedented government capital injec-
tions into the financial sector may provoke
future calls for similar interventions in autos,
airlines, and other nonfinancial sectors were
they to encounter negative shocks. Indeed, at
the time of this writing, the government has
proffered support to two financially troubled
Detroit automakers.
Furthermore, a policy of capital injections—
forced by international policy competition or
otherwise—mayprove self-defeatingeven in the
short term. Sound asset positions are a prereq-
uisite for normal lending by financial compa-
nies to mainline businesses. We are witnessing
how deteriorating assets of financial compa-
nies cause cutbacks in credit flows, both with-
in the financial sector and to nonbank busi-
nesses. We also know that bank assets include
a significant stock market component—direct
investments and loans collateralized using pri-
vate company stocks.TheTreasury’s purchases
of preferred stock in troubled financial firms
(a)dilute thevalueof existingshares, and (b) set
a precedent for a similar potential dilution in
other sectors.That expecteddilution is likely to
havecontributed todecliningstockmarket val-
ues and it implies a further weakening of bank
balance sheets, especially if stock values fail to
recoverquickly.This feedback implies that cap-
ital injectionswill be less effective at preventing
a broader credit crunch than appears at first
glance.
Furthermore, the bailout package imposes
counterproductive executive compensation
limits on firms that participate in government
assistanceprograms.According to theTreasury
bulletin on the capital injections program,
incentive compensation for senior executives
should not encourage unnecessary and exces-
sive risks that threaten the valueof the financial
institution; any bonus or incentive compensa-
tion paid to a senior executive based on state-
ments of earnings, gains, or other criteria that
are later proven to be materially inaccurate
should be clawed back; golden parachute pay-
ments to senior executiveswouldbeprohibited;
and executive compensation in excess of
$500,000 for each senior executive would no
longer be tax deductible for corporations.33
Similar conditions apply to the Treasury’s
Troubled Assets Relief Program. But executive
compensation limits threaten to make these
programs less effective.Theyprovideadditional
motivation for the financially healthiest firms
to avoid the stigma of participation: potential
private creditors would deem participating
firms as having weaker balance sheets andmay
avoid lending to them. If the government’s
involvementcontinuesover the longer term—as
appears likely—executive compensation limits
may siphon off talented executives to nonfi-
nancial firms and leave a key sector with rela-
tively less qualified and experiencedmanagers.
Long-term Implications
TheNationalBureauofEconomicResearch
has declared that the financial crisis has trig-
gered a recession—which commenced during
the lastquarterof2007.Contrary towhatmany
pundits suggest, this recessionmay last awhile,
even beyond 2009. If it does, it will mark the
beginningof an eraofpermanentlyhigher taxes
and slower economic growth in developed
countries. And it will hasten the impending fis-
cal crisis in entitlement programs.
Stock markets declined in reaction to both
17
Perhaps the
most important
argument against
purchasing
equity of private
companies is the
example of
Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.
361497_PA364_1stClass:361497_PA364_1stClass  3/12/2009  9:08 AM  Page 17
the initial failure, and the eventual passage, of
the U.S. bailout plan. They have continued to
decline despite coordinated efforts by the
world’s finance ministers and the decision of
the U.S. Treasury to purchase bank equity
insteadof just distressed assets. Ashomeprices
decline, financial institutions’ balance sheets
continue to weaken and the crisis spreads.
Broad-based bailouts of financial companies
are being implemented in Europe and replicat-
ed in the United States. But it remains uncer-
tain whether ongoing fiscal andmonetary ini-
tiatives will succeed and how quickly.
Thepast twoU.S. recessionsweremild, and
global economic growth was interrupted only
briefly. The hope is that bailouts will keep the
current economic recession short-lived and
shallow. But what is the likelihood that it will
be so? As of this writing, for example, stock
markets the world over had declined by 40 to
50 percent from peaks one year ago. As men-
tioned earlier, those declines place additional
strains on financial company balance sheets
andmay prolong tighter credit conditions.
The two previous recessions in 1991 and
2001 occurred under sound economic fun-
damentals: highly productive workforces,
strong consumption growth, continued
advances in global trade, and low taxes. This
time around, however, those fundamental
forces appear to be considerably weaker.
Consider, first, earnings growth. The most
experienced baby-boomer cohorts of U.S. and
European workers are now retiring. Although
a larger-than-anticipated percentage of older
U.S. workers have remained in the workforce
in recent years, a prolonged recession could
reverse this incipient trend. Credit shortages
and diminished consumption are forcing
firms to cut costs or downsize.34 Those pres-
sures are likely to hit older workers the hard-
est, with layoffs forcing earlier-than-planned
retirements. Forced or voluntary exits by the
most experienced workers in the labor force
will reduce overall labor quality and slow pro-
ductivity and earnings growth. That leads to
the conundrum that, asmany boomers realize
the need to extend their careers to avoid sharp
living standarddeclinesduring eventual retire-
ment, an economy in recession won’t provide
sufficient opportunities to many, leading to
excess worker supply and stagnant wage
growth.36 The current recession could make
this phenomenon quite intense. After the U.S.
economy emerges from the recession, howev-
er, a gradual erosion of labor quality will per-
sist, at least for another two decades, until the
boomers are fully retired.
American consumers, who are widely
viewed as drivers of global growth, have cut
back on spending. Last year’s oil price surge
slowed spending on non-oil goods. Although
oil prices have receded because of the global
economic slowdown, other factorswill contin-
ue to restrain consumer spendinggrowth.36 As
the baby boomers approach retirement, con-
cerns about the viability of public retirement
programs, recently devalued 401(k) accounts
from stock market declines and reduced job
security from rising unemployment, may
induce many households to increase their
rates of saving.
Slower consumption growth among devel-
oped economies could be replaced by faster
consumption growth in developing ones,
especially China and India. Trade has been the
one silver lining for the U.S. economy during
2007–2008: as the dollar depreciated, bur-
geoning exports sustained growth inU.S. out-
put. But thatmight change with bleaker glob-
al economic prospects. Indeed, an improving
current account balance during 2007 reversed
during the first two quarters of 2008.
Thus far, China’s rapid economic growth
has resulted from high domestic saving and
investment geared toward infrastructure,man-
ufacturing, and exports. With slowing global
consumer spending, China may encourage
faster domestic consumption growth to sus-
tain its manufacturing sector. Some of the
increase inChinese spendingwouldbeonnon-
Chinese goods and would benefit developed
economies’ exports and earnings. However,
China’spolicymakersmight raise tradebarriers
in an effort to insulate their economy from a
global recession. India is less exposed to a glob-
al recession because of its higher import con-
trols and tariffs, but a severe recession in west-
18
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ern countries could provoke a more protec-
tionist posture from India and other develop-
ing countries.
Overall, slowing global consumer demand,
labor productivity, and, potentially, trade
growth, worsen the prospects for private
investment spending. In the United States,
growth in gross private domestic investment
has exhibited a negative trend since 2005
(Figure 7). Together, those forces will make it
difficult to recover quickly from the ongoing
recession. If the bailoutmeasures in theUnited
Statesandabroaddonot soonrestore financial
stability—and there are powerful reasons to
doubt that theywill—policymakers are likely to
intensify debt-financed rescue efforts and
increase fiscal burdens on future taxpayers.
Indeed, as of thiswriting, Congress is consider-
ing anunprecedenteddebt-financed economic
stimulus package.37
Futuregenerations’ earningsarealready sig-
nificantly burdened by government obliga-
tions to pay public pension and health care
benefits to aging baby boomers. According to
government actuaries, unfunded obligations
on account of Social Security and Medicare
over the next 75 years amount to more than
$40 trillion.38 And Medicaid spending, which
has features similar to entitlement programs,
will cost another $16 trillion. In addition,
growing imbalances in regional and state gov-
ernment budgets will require steep cuts in ser-
vices and/ormuchhigher taxes.Unless govern-
ment entitlements and other commitments
canbe significantly reduced, the current raging
financial crisis could very likely become a
watershed moment, marking a shift to an era
of permanently higher taxes and, therefore,
permanently slower economic growth in the
United States.
Conclusion
This financial crisis and the ongoing eco-
nomic recession were triggered by oil price
shocks that began in late 2002 and intensified
in 2007. However, the seeds of the crisis were
planted years earlier, as policymakers purpose-
fully altered financial market regulations with
the intention of promoting U.S. homeowner-
ship. That policy prompted financial innova-
19
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tions to pool and spread mortgage risks and
channeled the global surge in saving into U.S.
mortgage-backed assets, especially into sub-
prime and Alt-A home loans. Those innova-
tions were tailored to reduce investors’ expo-
sure to the risk of localized real estate
downturns.However, the innovations simulta-
neously hid the extent and location of those
risks within financial firms’ asset portfolios
and magnified the risks of a broad financial
sector failure. Consequently, a downturn in
home prices since 2006, increasing mortgage
defaults, rising foreclosure risks, difficulties in
evaluating the quality of mortgage-backed
securities, and high leverage of investment
banksmadecreditors extremely fearfulof lend-
ing to financial institutions with high risk
exposures tomortgage-related securities.
Investment banks failed at regular intervals
during 2007 and 2008. Short-term credit flows
collapsed, jeopardizing funding for mainline
businesses and spawning a sustained negative
economic spiral. Financial sector disruptions
have reduced consumer confidence. Now, low-
er consumption is reducing output, employ-
ment, and stockmarket values, furtherweaken-
ing consumer and financialmarket confidence.
Eventually, trade flows may also be negatively
affected ifaglobal recessionprovokesanti-trade
policies as emerging economies seek protection
for domestic producers andworkers.
Sustainingconsumptionand investment in
the face of a housing wealth shock requires
supplementary resources and an expansion of
the pool of risk-bearing investors.Only foreign
savers and future generations could play this
role. Indeed, U.S. government debt-financed
wealth injections financed by future genera-
tions could encourage foreign savers to boost
their capital investments inU.S. financial firms
and restore the financial sector’s health.
The appropriate manner of channeling
debt-financed government assistance to finan-
cial firms, however, poses a difficult challenge.
Themultifarious fiscal and financial initiatives
of the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve,
respectively, have not worked so far and are
unlikely to restore market confidence. Under
the theory of financial market incompleteness
and failure, government debt-financed inter-
vention should be temporary, intended to
restore markets to health and not permanent-
ly supplant market operations with govern-
mentmanagement. Instead, current initiatives
appearpanickedandpoorlydesigned, threaten
to deplete talented financial sector personnel,
and suggest a trial-and-error process, which
only injects more uncertainty into markets
rather than restoring participants’ confidence.
Thegovernment initiativesbeing implemented
are biased toward introducing permanent
interventions in market processes and institu-
tions to the probable detriment of the nation’s
long-term economic prospects.
The bias toward making the government’s
expanded role in economic management per-
manent is emerging because the current finan-
cial mess is being unjustly blamed on market
forces rather thanonpriorgovernmentpolicies.
Politicians of both parties paid lip service to
reforminghome-loaninstitutions—FannieMae
and Freddie Mac—in order to make their port-
folios and operations financially sustainable.
Instead, policymakers commenced aggressive
promotion of home lending volumes since the
1990s.Absentpolicies topromotehomeowner-
ship among poorly qualified borrowers, non-
bank financial firms may have followed more
prudent lendingpolicies tominimize risk expo-
sures during the 1990s and early 2000s. And
global investors might have redirected their
funds toother sectorsandcountries togenerate
more balanced risk exposures and sustainable
increases inU.S. home values.
The fallout from the financial crisis will be
the forced increase in future generations’ debt
burdens to fund the financial bailout plan and
amassive economic stimulus package that the
U.S.Congress appears very likely to enact soon.
The increased government borrowing will add
to the already massive implicit debt burden
that future generations face on account of fed-
eral entitlement programs. Conventional wis-
domholds that fiscally responsible public pol-
icy reforms of entitlement programs won’t
emerge until a budgetary crisis becomes immi-
nent. If thecurrent financial crisismetastasizes,
the tax base shrinks, and tax rates become per-
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manently higher, economic growth will be
slowed and the entitlement crisis will be upon
us sooner than we have been expecting.
Notes
1. The National Bureau of Economic Research’s
Business Cycle Dating Committee has not
declared the start of an official recession as of yet,
but recent data on broad-based output and
employment declines imply that the official dec-
laration of an economic recession beginning in
the third quarter of 2008 is highly likely.
2. See Lutz Killian, “The Economic Effects of
Energy Price Shocks,” Journal of Economic Literature
46, no. 4 (December 2008). Killian suggests that
the primary impact of higher energy prices is
transmitted through changes in consumer and
firmdemands for goods and services—a decline in
aggregate demand and a shift in demand away
from energy-intensive goods, for instance, autos
and homes, that ripples through the economy.
3. According to the National Association of Real-
tors, total housing inventory at the end of July
2008 increased by 3.9 percent to 4.67million exist-
ing homes available for sale, which represents an
11.2-month supply. This includes condos, single-,
andmulti-family homes.
4. Data for the Case-Shiller composite index are
taken from the St. Louis Federal Reserve’s website
using their economic data download service
known as FRED.
5. See David Streitfeld and GretchenMorgenson,
“Building Flawed American Dreams,” New York
Times, October 19, 2008. The article documents
how “as theClinton administration’s top housing
official in the mid-1990s, Mr. Cisneros [head of
the federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development since 1993] loosened mortgage
restrictions so first-time buyers could qualify for
loans they could never get before.”
6. Alt-Amortgages are those that do not satisfy all
criteria to qualify as “conforming” mortgages
guaranteed by government-backed home loan
agencies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The
nonconforming features could include poor docu-
mentation of assets and income, high total bor-
rower debt-to-income ratios, too many problems
in the borrower’s credit history, or too high loan-
to-value ratio for the mortgage under considera-
tion. Alt-A borrowers have considerably better
qualifications on those criteria than subprime
borrowers.
7. The Bush administration repeatedly urged
reforms for Fannie and Freddie, but not suffi-
ciently vigorously to result in any legislation
before 2006, when Republicans enjoyed majori-
ties in both houses of Congress. The push for
expanded homeownership through the actions of
Fannie and Freddie received bipartisan support
throughout the early 21st century, and calls for
reforming the two financial institutions were
derided as creating an “artificial issue.” See Barney
Frank, “GSE Failure, A Phony Issue,” American
Banker, April 21, 2004.
8. According to the National Association of
Realtors, delinquency rates increased across the
boardon a year-over-year basis. Seasonally adjusted
delinquency rates moved up 120 basis points for
prime loans, 385 basis points for subprime loans, 5
basis points for FHA loans, and 67 basis points for
VA loans from the second quarter of 2007.
9. SeeWaynePassmore, “GSE Implicit Subsidy and
the Value of Government Ambiguity,” Finance and
Economic Discussion Series 2005–05, Federal Reserve
Board, 2005, http://www.federalreserve. gov/Pubs/
feds/2005/200505/ 200505pap.pdf.
10. For a more detailed discussion, see Gary
Gorton, “The Panic of 2007,” National Bureau of
Economic Research working paper no. 14357,
October 2008.
11. In an October 15, 2008, speech to the City
Club of New York, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke
suggested that, like AIG, Lehmanwas “large, com-
plex, and deeply embedded” in the financial sys-
tem, but the firm could not provide assurance
that a Fed loan would be repaid. Neither did the
Treasury have authority to absorb losses from
underwriting Lehman’s weak assets. That justifi-
cation for allowing Lehman to fail is curious
when considered in light of other, almost apolo-
getic, statements that financial firm failuresmust
be prevented when they pose systemic risks and
that the Fed will work closely with other authori-
ties to minimize such risks.
12. The TED spread’s normal range is between 0.2
and 0.4 percent. During early August of 2007, its
value doubled from 0.44 to 0.87 within the span
of five days. It continued to fluctuate between
1.00 and 2.00 percent during the entire year.
However, in mid-September 2008, it skyrocketed
to above 3.0 percent and continued to climb.
During October 2008, at the time of this writing,
the spread has remained consistently above 4.0
percent—nearly 10 times its normal level.
13. See Robin Sidel, “Abu Dhabi to Bolster
Citigroup, with $7.5 Billion Capital Infusion,”
Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2007. See also
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Edward Evans, “Merrill Lynch Gets $6.6 Billion
from Kuwait, Mizuho,” Bloomberg, January 15,
2008. These capital infusions are considerably
smaller than the $700 billion recommended by
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and appropri-
ated by Congress. Bloomberg data available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=new
sarchive&sid=aDmQ66OoJbfw shows that, glob-
ally, write-downs by financial firms on account of
credit losses far exceed the amount of new capital
raised, as of August 2008.
14. See Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss,
“Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information,” American Economic Review 71, no. 3
(June 1981): 393–410.
15. Note, however, that it is only an assumption
that future generations will be wealthier than cur-
rent generations. Borrowing excessively from
future generations to bail out current genera-
tions—by bequeathing a large debt burdens to
future taxpayers—may negate that assumption
because debt service may necessitate very high
future taxes. Given the already sizable fiscal
imbalances implied under current federal and
state government fiscal policies, borrowing addi-
tional funds from future generations risks signif-
icantly reducing future economic growth
prospects. The last section of this Policy Analysis
discusses prospects for future economic growth
in more detail.
16. A clear distinction between market incom-
pleteness and market failure needs to be main-
tained.Were current generations and their wealth
around today (that is, were markets complete),
they would share potential foreign lenders’ fear
about current generations’ creditworthiness and
the market failure would persist. However,
because under market incompleteness, future
generations’ welfare depends on the economic
success of current ones, it is assumed that they
would willingly extend support to current gener-
ations without regard to considerations of credit-
worthiness and returns on their “loans.” That is,
they would ignore the causes of current financial
market failure in helping to overcome it.
17. Private companies cannot perform this func-
tion because, were they to attempt it—say, by
increasing pension commitments to current
workers—those additional liabilities would be
immediately and fully offset by the companies’
reduced share prices. The government, on the
other hand, suffers little adverse effects on its
creditworthiness from deficit-financed capital
injections into firms today because government
has the power to levy taxes or spend less in the
future to service its debts. Note that the lack of
adverse impact is predicated on injecting capital
into firms rather than using the funds for addi-
tional consumption. As such, the injections are
expected to be substantially recouped once the
financial sector is restored to health. If the addi-
tional borrowing were intended to fund increased
current consumption, then interest rates and gov-
ernment debt service costs would increase. Note
that the previous footnote’s argument implies
that future generations would not care how the
funds were used so long as they successfully
restored the efficient operations of financial mar-
kets and the economy.
18. The three main nationally recognized statisti-
cal research organizations are Moody’s, Standard
and Poor’s, and Fitch.
19. For a more detailed discussion, see Gorton.
20. See Ben Protess, “‘Flawed’ SEC Program Failed
to Rein in Investment Banks,” ProPublica (October
1, 2008), http://www.propublica.org/article/
flawed-sec-program-failed-to-rein-in-investment-
banks-101/. Protess documents how the SEC’s
“consolidated supervised program” relaxed mini-
mum capital requirements for firms that submit-
ted to SECoversight—a program that is believed to
have allowed the tremendous increase in leverage
ratios of erstwhile investment banks.
21. For a good discussion, see William Poole,
“Fundamentals of the Financial Crisis: Misman-
aging Risk” (speech to Delaware Captive Insurance
Association, October 2008).
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with the right to purchase (or sell) securities at a
predetermined price and by a preset date. See the
description by Robert C. Merton in his article on
options in theNewPalgraveDictionary of Economics,
2nd ed. (2007).
23. See Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, “The
Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,”
Journal of Political Economy 81, no. 3 (1973): 637–54.
24. The idea of riskmagnificationmay havemoti-
vated a famous comment byWarren E. Buffet: “In
our view . . . derivatives are financial weapons of
mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while
now latent, are potentially lethal.” See (annual let-
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February 21, 2003), http://image.guardian.co.
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pdf.pdf.
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decisions. See remarks byDevenSharma, president
of Standard and Poor’s Ratings Agency,
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/me
dia/Sharma_FDIC_Final.pdf.
26. Indeed, AIG’s trading strategy in the CDS
market was predicated only on key characteristics
of the assets being insured. It did not take
account of the risk that creditors would demand
additional collateral as evidence of creditworthi-
ness in a declining housing market. See Carrick
Mollenkamp, et al., “Behind AIG’s Fall, Risk
Models Failed to Pass Real-World Test,”Wall Street
Journal, November 3, 2008, A-1.
27. See Ben Bernanke (speech before the City Club
of New York, October 15, 2008). Chairman
Bernanke hints that the economy will take a long
time to recover even if the financial sector returns
to relative normalcy in the near future as a result of
government actions among developed countries.
28. Some observers have recommended that
homeowners should be directly helped via debt
renegotiations to prevent escalating foreclosures.
This step is politically popular but if it results in
keeping unqualified homeowners in their
homes—those with sub-prime and Alt-A mort-
gages who are now unable to service their mort-
gages—it could worsen the incentives of other
homeowners to continue servicing their mort-
gages. Themarket failure is in the financial sector,
where normal credit flows need to be restored.
Hence, most of the bailout funds should be chan-
neled toward the financial sector. Indeed, direct-
ing the funds to directly bailing out poorly quali-
fied homeowners compounds and extends the
initial error of aggressively pushing for increased
homeownership instead of sustaining and
strengthening regulations against imprudent
mortgage lending. See Edward Glaeser and
JosephGyourko, “TheCase againstHousing Price
Supports,” Berkeley Electronic Press 6, no. 5 (2008).
29. See Jordan Rappaport, “A Guide to Aggregate
House Price Measures,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City Economic Review 2007, no. 2.
30. The same method of estimating total stock
market capitalization is followed by Karl E. Case,
John M. Quigley, and Robert F. Shiller in
“Comparing Wealth Effects: The Stock Market
versus the Housing Market,” Berkeley Electronic
Press 5, no. 1 (2005). The large number of unsold
homes and the decline in home prices reflects a
reduction in our valuation of homes that are
already built. The decline in stock market values
also does not reflect any immediate decline in the
nation’s overall productive capacity today.
However, it does reflectmarket participants’ views
of how efficiently and profitably we’ll use that
capacity in the future, given the financial sector’s
disruption. Moreover, the decline in stockmarket
wealth is likely to negatively affect households’
consumption, saving, investment, and risk-taking
behavior. That may further impede the full use of
the nation’s tangible productive assets.
31. This announcement may be intended to
deflect attention from the fact that those who
receive bailout funds would have the weakest bal-
ance sheets among healthy financial firms—to
prevent others from refusing to conduct business
with them.
32. Another advantage claimed by proponents of
capital injections compared to purchases of bad
assets from financial firms is that the former is
associated with a larger credit multiplier. It is not
clear that this claim is correct. Under the former,
for each extra dollar of capital that the firm
receives, it can support multiple dollars of loans.
But the toxic mortgage-backed assets would
remain on firms’ balance sheets, which must use
up some firm capital to limit leverage ratios and
which may continue to hinder borrowing and
lending activity because traders continue to wor-
ry about the soundness of their counterparties’
balance sheets. Purchases of toxic assets would
occur at a discounted price and would provide
less than a dollar of loanable funds for each dol-
lar of such assets sold to the government. Hence,
the credit multiplier will create a smaller dollar
amount of extra loans. But the government’s
bailout budget is bounded at $700 billion. Under
either strategy, financial firms as a whole would
receive the same total increment in loanable
funds. Under the latter, however, toxic assets
would be eliminated along with traders’ worries
about the soundness of their counterparties’ bal-
ance sheets.
33. See the Treasury Department’s announce-
ment on Executive Compensation Rules under
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act,
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/2008
101495019994.htm.
34. See “GDP and the Economy: Final Estimates
for the SecondQuarter of 2008,” Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Survey of Current Business, October
2008, http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2008/10%20
October/1008_gdpecon.pdf.
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35. A recent demographic and economic simula-
tion by the author suggests that the retirement of
the boomers is likely to introduce a long phase of
sluggish productivity and wage growth in the
United States. See Jagadeesh Gokhale, Social
Security: A Fresh Look at ReformAlternatives (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, forthcoming).
36. See Killian.
37. See Paul Krugman, “Let’s Get Fiscal,”NewYork
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